psf-emudhra-mitigate(8)

Script: /opt/psf-security-patches/pki/emudhra-mitigate.sh. Tool page: eMudhra CA compromise. Source. With the package installed: man psf-emudhra-mitigate.

eMudhra intermediate CA compromise, mitigation  (v1)
Disclosed 20 Oct 2026: https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/

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The private keys of eight eMudhra intermediate CAs can be recovered from
their certificates. Browsers block them through OneCRL, CRLite and CRLSets,
but the system CA store, and everything that reads it (OpenSSL, GnuTLS, curl,
wget, apt, git, Python, PHP, Go, Ruby, Java via ca-certificates-java), keeps
trusting them until ca-certificates is updated. This script distrusts the
roots that anchor them and then proves the store rejects all of them.

Usage:
  ./emudhra-mitigate.sh [command] [--force] [--ignore-env]

  check            environment report only; changes nothing, root optional
                   (exit 0 = ok, 1 = hard blocker, 2 = needs --ignore-env)
  apply (default)  distrust the affected certificates in the system store,
                   rebuild it, fix the Java keystore, and verify
  status           mitigation state, store tests and stale processes
  restore          undo everything this script distrusted (re-exposes you
                   if ca-certificates isn't patched)
  cleanup          once ca-certificates is patched: remove this script's
                   distrust, but only if the store still rejects every
                   compromised intermediate afterwards (--force skips the
                   patch check, never the store test)
  version          print the script version and exit

  --ignore-env     proceed past soft environment blockers (a running
                   process or system-wide override uses a CA store this run
                   can't fix). Hard blockers (non-Debian, no
                   update-ca-certificates, no openssl, not root) can't be
                   overridden.

Every command first checks, in order: OS (Debian, Ubuntu, Trisquel and
popular derivatives), the system CA store and its package, other CA stores
(Java, Python certifi and other bundles, Node.js, NSS, overrides), then system
(root, container, tools). The system store's patch state is reported from
three signals: the fixed build for your release, extra FIXED_BUILDS, and the
package changelog. The verdict that matters is functional: every command
tests each store against the 16 published intermediate certificates, which
are embedded below and checked against their published SHA-256 fingerprints.

Env overrides:
  FIXED_BUILDS="20250419~deb12u2"   extra fixed ca-certificates builds
  SCAN_PATHS="/opt /srv ..."         where to look for bundled CA files;
                                     empty disables the scan
  SCAN_DEPTH=9                       find -maxdepth for that scan
  TEST_HOSTS="api.example.com:443"   hosts to TLS-test before and after
                                     apply, to catch collateral breakage
  JAVA_STOREPASS=changeit            Java keystore password

Debian/Ubuntu/Trisquel layout: /etc/ca-certificates.conf and
update-ca-certificates. A "!" line in that file survives package upgrades
(the ca-certificates postinst and debconf config keep deselected entries).
     PSF_LOCK_WAIT    seconds a run that changes the host waits for another one that is already
                      changing it (default 30), then stops with exit 2; the lock is STATE_DIR/.lock

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